Many observers view tomorrow’s European championships qualification match between Norway and Portugal as a David and Goliath contest – where Norway (despite leading its group) will be playing the role of the little naked guy with the stone, facing off against the terrible Portuguese football giant. These types of asymmetrical matchups are also common throughout the international security system, where stronger states are viewed as threatening by smaller ones. In this context, the United States usually gets to play Goliath against either a very small David (North Korea), a bit larger one (Iran), a full grown David (China) or an opponent resembling something like a decrepit Goliath (Russia). But whether it is football or security policy, the weaker part still has a way of levelling the playing field. David had the rock, the Norwegian national team has Drillo football and North Korea has the Bomb.
During the 1990s, Egil "Drillo" Olsen successfully managed the Norwegian side by applying a rigid philosophy and a methodical, organized playing style that emphasized some of football's asymmetric weapons such as counterattacks and headers. The team's style of play was quite effective in creating sudden scoring opportunities but also proved highly disruptive to the playing style of the opponent, hindering their ability to score. The most notable result of this style of play was Norway's ability to compete evenly with – and often win – against opponents with superior playing ability.
Drillo’s style of play generated a great deal of criticism, particularly from those concerned with the aesthetics of the game. Drillo football seemed ugly, and in some ways even an unethical playing style…but it worked. And when confronting a stronger opponent, the scoreboard is the ultimate arbiter of success. Norway’s unusually high FIFA rankings (at one point in the 1990s it was number two in the world and is currently ranked eleventh) bear witness to the efficacy of asymmetric Drillo football, just as the non-Drillo years illustrate the true power relationship in international football.
In a similar fashion, international power relationships are often characterized by power imbalances. In such cases, the weaker state usually applies similar asymmetric tactics such as guerrilla warfare or WMD acquisition. Throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations, the United States had expressed concern over states such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria. The 2003 Iraq invasion was initially motivated by worries that the Hussein regime was developing a nuclear weapon.
Had Iraq been able to demonstrate such a capability prior to the invasion, the regime would likely still be in power just as the Kim Jong Il’s regime has remained in North Korea. A nuclear weapon is the ultimate stone of David’s, levelling the odds against a superior opponent. While many other domestic factors also influence a state’s decision to acquire such technology, the strategic logic of wielding such a powerful asymmetric weapon is undeniable. Examples abound, from the geographically weak Israel to the conventionally weak Russia.
The most interesting example – and the best example of Drillo football – is China. Not only has it acquired a nuclear capability with which to balance the United States, but it also has followed Drillo’s effective formula. China is acquiring a series of asymmetrical capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons, submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles and technologies that hinder US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. In true Drillo fashion, these are capabilities that are designed not so much to provide an offensive weapon for China, but rather a way to disrupt the US from projecting power in East Asia. China won’t score goals, but it can hinder the US from scoring – and pressuring China politically.
Two final observations are worth making. First, the United States is considered to be a Goliath not due to its nuclear capabilities, but rather because it’s conventional military power is so formidable. Reductions to the US nuclear arsenal are therefore not likely to reassure smaller states such as North Korea or Iran and inspire them to give up their nuclear programs. Arms reduction efforts may reduce potential arms race pressures with current nuclear weapons states such as Russia and China, an important outcome in its own right. But just as outlawing counterattacks in football would harm Norway more than it would Portugal, global nuclear disarmament leaves the United States as the dominant Goliath without any asymmetric threats. In this way, President Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague was a clever strategic move.
Secondly, the invasions of Iraq and Libya have now confirmed what many smaller states have long suspected: a lack of nuclear weapons leaves regimes open to the threat of invasion by Western countries. In the case of Libya, it was an even worse signal: the regime gave up its nuclear program and then was attacked by NATO only a few years later. Had it retained a nuclear program, NATO would almost certainly not be bombing it today. It is difficult to see how the regimes in Iran and North Korea would now be more willing to negotiate the removal of their nascent nuclear capabilities.
Just as Drillo has demonstrated during his two terms as Norway’s football trainer, weaker players can even the odds quite a bit by employing asymmetrical weapons. It may not be an aesthetically pleasing or even ethical playing style, but it is understandable. Because it works. The biblical David knew it, Drillo knows it, and North Korea certainly knows it.
Les også Michael Mayers blogginnlegg om Graham Allisons besøk ved Institutt for forsvarsstudier.
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